Monday December 11

9.00-9.45 Welcome

Professor Jennifer Windsor, Pro-Vice-Chancellor and Dean, Humanities and Social Science

Mihi whatakau: Elijah Pue (Te Ātihaunui-a-Pāpārangi, Te Ātiawa, Ngāti Tūwharetoa)

Announcements and Arrangements (Organisers)

9.45-11.15

Panel 1A

Early Voting

Chair and Discussant: Shaun Ratcliff

Ian McAllister and Damon Muller

Convenience Voting, Election Campaigning and Party Advantage in Australia

There has been an international trend in recent years towards voters casting an early ballot convenience vote. In the 2016 Australian federal election almost one in three votes were cast in this way, most of them in person using pre-polling centres. This trend towards early voting raises both normative and practical questions about the purpose of election campaigns and how they are conducted. This paper uses multivariate analysis applied to the 2016 Australian Election Study to test five hypotheses related to convenience voting. The results show that convenience voters have less confidence in political institutions, but that they tend to be more committed voters and partisans. There are small but significant electoral advantages to be gained from convenience voting for the Liberal-National Coalition.

Jill Sheppard and Katrine Beauregard

Early voting in Australia: the costs and benefits of convenience

Pre-election day voting increases the opportunities for citizens to vote in an election. This paper asks, first, which voters take the opportunity to vote before election day in Australia, and second, do early voters forgo acquiring campaign information as a result of that decision, and consequently cast an 'underinformed' vote? Where voting is voluntary, pre-election (or 'early') voting can expand the voter base to include those citizens who are unable to vote on a prescribed election day. In a compulsory voting system, such as Australia, early voting lowers the costs of voting for citizens who are compelled to cast a vote in an election, and who would otherwise be compelled to vote on a prescribed day. We may therefore expect that in a compulsory system, early voting has the effect of bringing forward some voter turnout, while voter turnout remains steady in aggregate, rather than increasing total voter turnout. Using 2016 Australian Election Study data, we hypothesise that female, low-information, and elderly voters are the most likely to cast an early vote in
Australia. Accordingly, we hypothesise that early voters are more likely than late voters to rely on identification heuristics when deciding their vote. This research has implications for both the empirical and normative literatures on convenience voting and electoral administration.

Holly Ann Garnett
Early Voting: Comparing Canada, Finland, Germany and Switzerland
Do early voting opportunities mobilize under-represented population groups? Or do the additional cognitive costs associated with early voting deter under-represented groups from taking advantage of these opportunities? This article considers the socio-demographic and attitudinal correlates of early voting across a number of elections in four jurisdictions: days-long advance voting in Canada, week-long advance voting in Finland, on-demand postal voting in Germany and automatic postal voting in Switzerland. This article finds that early voting is unlikely to mobilize commonly under-represented population groups, with the exception of the elderly, who are often quite likely to take advantage of early voting opportunities.

9.45-11.15
Panel 1B
Immigration and Settlement
Chair and Discussant: Fiona Barker

Lachlan McNamee and Zhang Ruxi
Go West Young Han? International Conflict and State-Sponsored Resettlement
This paper theorizes when and why states engage in an under-appreciated tool in international conflicts: state-sponsored resettlement. We argue that states settle frontier areas when they view existing populations as potentially loyal to a hostile competitor and seek to shore up control by changing demographic facts on the ground. We then identify the role that state-sponsored resettlement played in the long conflict between the People’s Republic of China and the USSR. Analysing a novel panel of all inter-provincial migration in China since 1953 and using a difference-in-differences design, we find that the geopolitical shock of the Sino-Soviet split (1959-1982) led to a significant increase in Han migration to Chinese provinces bordering the USSR. Examining a contested province å¬ Xinjiang å¬ in detail by exploiting a novel county-year dataset on all Han Chinese migration to Xinjiang since 1953, we find that spatio-temporal variation in Han settlement of Xinjiang was also responsive to the threat posed by the USSR. The historical record supports our argument that the Chinese state regarded settlers as useful in shoring up its control over contested areas as Han settlers were used to dilute the demographic dominance of potentially disloyal ethnic minorities who were co-ethnics with populations in the USSR.

Woo Chang Kang and Emily Look
Inequality, Social Heterogeneity, and Attitudes toward Migrants in Australia
In recent years, and following the Global Financial Crisis in particular, inequality has been the subject of increasing scholarly attention. However, scholars differ on the extent to which this may be true in Australia. In this paper, we explore how inequality affects Australians’ attitudes towards immigration. To our knowledge, no study has examined the ways in which local economic and social context affect attitudes towards immigration in Australia. Using the 2013 Australian Election Studies data, we examine how the effects of income and being Australia-born vary with different local context; namely, whether inequality and ethnic heterogeneity at the local level alters the effect of the individual-level variables. Our multi-level modeling analysis shows that poor and Australian born people hold more negative attitudes toward increasing immigrants in general. Interestingly, local context only affects the effect of being Australian born but not the effect of income. The native-immigrants difference disappears in the electoral district where level of inequality is lower than average and/or the ratio of non-Australian born population is greater than the average.
Tyler Kustra
How Diasporas Influence American Foreign Policy: The Case of Economic Sanctions
This paper examines how diasporas in the United States, and the distribution of diasporas across states, affect American sanctions policy. Although the size of a country's diaspora in the United States does not affect whether it is sanctioned, countries with larger diasporas in states which are swing states in the American presidential election are more likely to be sanctioned. Using the size of the diaspora in swing states as an instrumental variable for the imposition of economic sanctions, this paper finds that economic sanctions do not affect the probability of regime change.

11.45-1.15
Panel 2A
Theory and Measures
Chair and Discussant: Shawn Treier
Enzo Lenine Lima
Models, explanation and the pitfalls of empirical testing
Formal models constitute an essential part of contemporary Political Science. Their recent History is tightly tied to the developments of Rational Choice Theory, which is considered to be the only deductive theory in the Social Sciences. This unique character, especially its manifestation through mathematical symbolisms, has caused profound schisms and criticisms in the discipline. Formal models have constantly been accused of being built on unrealistic assumptions of human behaviour and social structure, rendering as a result either trivial predictions or no empirical prediction at all. Nevertheless these criticisms frequently ignore essential elements of the concept of explanation and how it is applicable to formal modelling. In this paper, I provide an approach to mathematical modelling that considers the challenges of designing and performing empirical tests of a model's predictions. In my understanding, rather than disqualifying or falsifying models, empirical tests are paramount to the tailoring of more grounded explanations of political phenomena and should be seen as a tool to enhance modelling. In order to achieve this goal, we should precisely define what we mean by explanation and how models work in providing explanatory predictions of political phenomena.

Jeremiah Brown
Expanding the Democratic Model: A New Measure of Democratic Quality
Freedom is an essential component in any definition of democracy. Theoretical debate about the concept of freedom suggests that there a plurality of possible definitions which have an important relationship with democracy. Yet, in the current measurement of democracy, freedom is generally defined using a non-interference conception. This paper presents a new measure of democracy which uses a more expansive conception of freedom based upon the capability approach. The new measure is compared to other measures of democracy to demonstrate that employing a different theoretical conception of freedom translates into a different empirical evaluation of democracy in the world today. These differences in the output of the new measure are considered in relation to some contemporary discussions on declining democratic quality in established democracies to suggest that the new measure can be a valuable tool for scholars trying understand the relative quality of democracy in established democratic societies.

11.45-1.15
Panel 2B
Populism
Chair and Discussant: David Denemark
Wilfred Chow
Economic Crises, Anxiety, and the Rise of Populism
Recently, economic crises and rising support for populism have defined a large portion of American politics. What explains these parallel trends? Existing studies explain this by either invoking the economic insecurity (e.g., job fears) or cultural backlash (e.g., identity politics) thesis. However, these studies do not explain the link between economic shocks such as financial crises electorate shifts toward populist positions. This study addresses this gap by arguing that economic shocks push economically anxious voters to embrace the populist positions. Focusing my analysis on trade policy, I hypothesize that economic shocks on economically anxious individuals encourages these individuals to oppose trade liberalization but these shocks do not affect non-anxious individuals. Using a survey experiment of 816 U.S. subjects drawn from Amazon Turk, I find that individuals exposed to an economic crisis treatment oppose trade liberalization only if these individuals also exhibit greater economic anxiety (e.g., job loss fears). Subjects without economic anxiety do not respond to this treatment but rather decide trade policy based on other factors such as nationalism. These results have implications for both international political economy and party politics scholars as they explain the link between economic crises and populist politics.

Charles Miller, Paul Kenny and Dongwook Kim
The International Political Economy of Populism
Populists are personalistic leaders who seek to win and retain power by directly mobilizing mass constituencies of voters. They often make appeals to the “common people” that explicitly stress nationalist aims or that target lower class voters who face competition from globalization. There are thus strong reasons to expect that populists in power should be more protectionist than non-populist democratic leaders. At the same time, populists often promise to cultivate deeper bilateral economic relationships with the countries of like-minded leaders. This paper first theorizes the international political economy of populist government. Second, it provides the first test of whether populism is associated with an increase in general protectionism and/or a turn towards bilateralism. It uses a new dataset on populist and non-populist rule in 85 countries from 1980-2014, along with updated measures of trade openness, financial openness, treaty compliance, and bilateral trade agreements.

2.00-3.15
Panel 3A
Trade and Its Consequences 1
Chair and Discussant: Tim Hellwig

Chungshik Moon and Dale L. Smith
BITs and FDI: Credible Commitments and Interdependent Choices.
Under what conditions do Foreign Directed Investment (FDI) inflows increase? How do different commitment mechanisms, domestic property rights and international investment treaties, jointly affect FDI inflows? We answer these questions by examining the preferences of two key actors, host governments and foreign investors. Host governments will calculate their expected costs of signing a BIT and these costs will be much higher for those with weak domestic institutions. Thus, we predict that host countries with good domestic institutions are more likely to sign BITs. At the investment stage, the foreign investor’s preferences shape investment decisions. Given the lack of a strong domestic commitment device, foreign investors may find the role of international commitment institutions more useful in signaling the host government’s intention to protect its property and profits. This leads us to expect that the effects of an international commitment device will be stronger among those who have weak domestic institutions. The empirical results covering non-OECD countries from 1970 to 2008 clearly support these two propositions: countries with strong domestic institutions are likely to sign BITs, and the effect of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) on FDI inflows is greater among host countries with weak domestic
institutions. This finding is robust with different measures of the key variables as well as estimation techniques.

Byungwon Woo
Globalization and Housing Inequality
How does globalization affect the quality of housing in developing countries? While housing is an important part of one’s life and ‘globalization’ receives a myriad of scholarly attention in the past few decades, little systematic research has been done on the link between globalization and the quality of housing at a global scale. This research aims to provide a seminal study on the relationship between globalization and housing. We theorize that globalization encourages mass production and mass consumption, which in turn will catalyze rural to urban migration and hence increase demand for slum housing. A government might ease the problem by providing more public housing, but we believe that such government intervention might not be very plausible given that governments are often pressured to go lean in face of steeper global competition. Thus, we expect that globalization worsens the quality of housing. Empirically, we approximate the quality of housing by looking at slum dwellings and examine the relationship between globalization and slum dwellings. Using multilevel analysis and city-level slum data, we indeed report that there indeed exists a negative relationship between globalization and slums: the more globalized countries, cities within them are likely to have more people living in slums.

2.00-3.15
Panel 3B
Foundations of Electoral Democracy
Chair and Discussant: Jill Sheppard
Moritz Osnabruegge, Elliott Ash, and Massimo Morelli
This paper provides evidence on how electoral systems affect policymaking in a representative democracy. A 1993 electoral reform in New Zealand replaced a first-past-the-post system with a mixed-member proportional electoral system. We examine how this natural experiment affected ideological positions of parliamentarians, measured from the text of 400,000 parliamentary speeches in the period 1987 through 2002. We find increases in ideological polarization between parties and decreases in ideological cohesion within parties. To understand better the policy impacts of these effects, we provide a new supervised learning method for classifying speeches by policy topic, and by whether the speech supports expansion or reduction of the policy relative to status quo.

David Denemark, Robert Mattes and Richard G.Niemi
An original 2012 survey of 11th grade students in metropolitan Cape Town, South Africa--the first generation to complete their education in post-apartheid schools -- demonstrates that they are less supportive of democracy than older generations who struggled against apartheid and fought to build the new Republic. These students are the product of a reformed school curriculum largely based on an approach recommended by recent civic education research, which emphasizes the importance of the methods by which schools and teachers train students in democracy more than what they actually teach. However, our study shows that the most important cause for students’ low levels of support for democracy is the failure of schools to impart basic facts about South African politics and an appreciation of the role of active, critical, and peaceful participation by citizens. This paper uses multi-level regression analysis to examine the contextual, attitudinal and educational factors that foster and stymie support for democracy and rejection of authoritarianism among the young in perhaps the world’s highest profile emerging democracy. It provides important insights into the broader question: can the young ‘learn democracy’ and the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship in new democracies.
The Science of Democracy: Political Science and the Evolution of Voting Rights

Democracy constantly evolves, as norms of what is fair and right change and as the power relations within society shift. The paradox of democracy is that those elected to represent the people make the laws that govern their own re-election, and those laws determine who can vote and how much peoples’ votes count. The recourse for those who feel they are on the losing end of new election laws comes, most often, through the courts. Every new voting law and every cycle of districting, and the litigation that follows, alters the meaning of voting rights.

This lecture explores how political scientists’ involvement in legal cases has helped define and protect voting rights in the United States and throughout the world. My vantage is that of both a researcher removed from the fray and an expert witness deeply engaged in it. Serving as an expert in 14 different election law cases has revealed to me how political science has helped establish the foundations of voting rights, created concrete standards for the enforcement of voting rights, and continues to develop innovative methodologies to answer the factual questions that determine whether individuals’ voting rights have been violated and what remedy might address the problem.

Election law is far from settled law. On the horizon lie new challenges. Increasing integration of multiple racial groups in urban areas make it difficult to draw districts in which any one group is a majority. Can districts in which no one group is a majority but racial and ethnic minorities are a majority of voters provide effective representation for all groups? How can we determine whether race, and not partisan gain, was the motivation behind a particular law? And there remains the difficult question of party. What counts as partisan fairness, and how can the courts create effective remedies to guarantee equal voting rights of people on the basis of their political beliefs and partisan attachments?
between personality traits and foreign policy attitudes is scarce. This paper pursues two related questions. Do individual differences (namely, in the Big Five personality traits) influence attitudes toward foreign policy? Are the relationships between personality traits and foreign policy observed across different country contexts, or do they differ? In pursuing answers to these questions, the paper draws on new data from a series of large-scale public opinion surveys in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany.

Thomas Jamieson
Information, Public Opinion, and International Relations: Evidence from Experimental and Historical Data
In this paper, I argue that people's political attitudes are contingent on their pursuit of information and their attention to international affairs. I test this contention using multiple methods: 1) an online survey experiment on 298 participants in the United States, and 2) large-N analysis of historical public opinion data. The experimental findings demonstrate that people search for information, improve their political knowledge, and update their attitudes about international affairs when they have explicit incentives to make correct decisions. Tests using historical public opinion data supplement these results, demonstrating that people search for information about world affairs during foreign policy crises, when people perceive there are consequences of making wrong decisions. Collectively, the findings suggest that people search for information and update their attitudes as the stakes of making correct decisions increase. This has important implications for the study of public opinion and international relations, suggesting that people are capable of effective decision making when it matters most.

Zoe Meers and Luke Mansillo
Australian Anti-Americanism before and after Trump: what are the implications for foreign policy preferences?
The U.S. election in November 2016 resulted in an outcome that surprised many elites in the political sphere. Donald Trump’s platform and policies were unclear; policy wonks, the media, and pollsters were demoralized by their defeat in an election that many predicted was an easy win for the Clinton campaign. The change of presidency in January 2017 marked a period of uneasiness: no one quite knew what was going to happen next. In various reports, Australians have expressed reluctance to embrace the Trump administration. It remains to be seen whether this change in sentiment towards the presidency will be consequential for the Australian public’s beliefs towards American involvement in the Asia-Pacific region. We exploit two-wave survey data collected in late 2015 and in February 2017 to assess whether the Australian public’s beliefs towards the United States have negatively shifted since the election as well as whether this shift in Anti-American sentiment has affected Australian perceptions of the United States’ role in the Asia-Pacific. We measure Anti-Americanism as the quadratic proximity utility between assessments of American stereotypes and the average stereotype of Indonesian, South Korean, Japanese and Chinese citizens relative to their in-group stereotype for Australians.

9.15-10.45
Panel 5B
Representation and Power
Chair and discussant: Ian McAllister
Annika Werner
What Voters Want from Their Parties: It's Okay to Break Promises
How should party governments make representative democracy? Much of the democracy representation literature assumes that voters expect parties to fulfill the promises of their election campaigns, with higher expectations placed on the party a voter supports. What voters actually want from their parties, however, remains largely unclear. Within the context of Australia, this article investigates voter expectation regarding three ideal, post-election
party behaviors: promise keeping, focus on public opinion, and seeking the public interest. Furthermore, it tests whether voters expect their party to keep their promises. Using a novel survey tool and ordered logistic regression models, this study finds that, generally, voters care least about parties keeping their promises and their expectations are unaffected by their party support. These results, if confirmed in other contexts, not only challenge the primacy of promise keeping, but also the assumed ubiquitous party effect.

Amy Catalinac, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith
We reexamine how elections are won and lost in democracies. Drawing upon Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2016), we posit that candidates and parties can increase the number of votes won by converting elections into tournaments between teams, in which the team supplying the most votes is rewarded with private goods after the election. We examine the applicability of this mechanism in contemporary Japan, where the question of why the Liberal Democratic Party was able to gain a plurality of seats in every House of Representatives (HOR) election from 1958 until 2009, even after Japan's 1994 electoral reform, has been a longstanding puzzle. We assemble data on the universe of municipalities in existence in Japan from 1980-2012, including demographic characteristics, central government transfers, votes captured by candidates and parties in each municipality in the eleven HOR elections held in the same period, and estimates derived from quantitative text analysis of the degree to which candidates focused on the different municipalities within their districts during campaigns. Our results shed new light on the general puzzle of how political elites whose policies enjoy little popular appeal can persist in power, and specifically, how the LDP has done so in contemporary Japan.

Shaun Ratcliff, Luke Mansillo and Simon Jackman
Measuring public opinion for small groups and areas using voter advice applications and MRP
Understanding the variation in public opinion across population groups and geography is important when we seek to understand how democratic systems represent citizens’ preferences. Our capacity to do so is constrained, though: by the availability of data on public opinion, which is becoming harder to obtain as response rates decline; and it has always been difficult to collect for sub-national geographic areas and small population groups.

We examine how non-representative surveys (voter advice applications, or VAAs) studied with multilevel regression and post-stratification (MRP) can provide a previously unavailable data source. By offering respondents a payoff for participating – locating their policy preferences relative the positions taken by political parties – these surveys deliver a cost-effective method to collect vast population samples (frequently >100,000), with substantial data collected on demographics, political behaviours and attitudes.

After fitting our models to these data, we externally validate the results against national election outcomes and commercial opinion polling. We then demonstrate how these data can be used to estimate public opinion for a broad range of issue preferences at a level of granularity traditionally impossible for most countries. We use these data to show how public opinion varies across Australia; the issues cleavages that differentiate the parties from each other, and those on which they are cross-pressured; and how non-random non-voting by segments of the electorate biases the policy preferences expressed through national elections, even in a country with ‘compulsory’ voting.
Henry Thomson, Halvard Buhaug, Henrik Urdal, and Elisabeth Rosvold
The frequency of armed conflict has declined markedly over the last few decades, and the world is generally more peaceful today than during the twentieth century. Levels of political unrest in cities, however, have not followed this trend. In this paper, we examine a new city-level dataset on urban social disorder in the entire developing world between 1960 and 2014 to document and explain its continued prevalence in the post-Cold War period. We argue that contentious political activity and conflict in the urban environment follow a distinct logic from that of civil war, which occurs primarily in the periphery. In models of monthly indicators of urban unrest, we explore the effects of elections on social disorder in cities. We find a significant, non-linear ‘inverted U’-shaped relationship between democratization and the likelihood of unrest at elections. Elections are associated with urban social disorder at middling levels of democracy. These results suggest that broad global trends towards greater urbanization and democratization are driving continuing political instability in the cities of the developing world.

Svitlana Chernykh
The Dilemma of Electoral Compliance
Despite the recent increase in studies of electoral compliance, few have wrestled with the conceptual and empirical difficulties that plague research on post-electoral disputes. What is electoral compliance? What action can a political party take to signify its rejection of electoral results? In this paper, I introduce the Electoral Compliance and Rejection (ECR) Data Collection Project that measures electoral rejection in Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia and Africa. ECR uses the political party as the unit of analysis permitting users to manipulate the data for a wide variety of purposes. I first discuss the main strategies that political parties can use to reject electoral outcomes. Next, using ECR, I present the trends in electoral compliance around the world in the last 25 years. I conclude with an empirical analysis that investigates the effects of election-level and party-level characteristics on post-election disputes.

Richard Frank
Violence during the election cycle
Why do some elections precipitate violence while others do not? Some argue that the violence results from either a government repressing their opponents or an opposition group protesting contests seen as lacking integrity. However, most recent research focuses on the overall probability of violence occurring during the election cycle not when in the electoral process it is most likely to occur and what events precipitate it. This paper begins to fill this gap by (1) describing the crucial events that occur during the election cycle that often precipitate violence and (2) analyzing newly gathered electoral cycle data on a random selection of over 350 elections in 50 countries from 1991 to 2016. My findings will both significantly forward the literature’s understanding of the temporal dynamics of electoral violence and provide much more fine-grained policy implications for reducing the risk of violence.
Rhonda Evans
Measuring the Political Salience of Decisions of the High Court of Australia: Does the American Measure Travel?
Scholars have generated a large literature that seeks to measure the salience of decisions of the US Supreme Court, but they have not yet applied these measures to the final courts of other countries. This is problematic because advancement of the subfield of comparative judicial studies rests upon the development of common measures. This paper, which focuses on the High Court of Australia, constitutes a first step in filling this lacuna. The prevailing line of research concerning case salience assumes that newspaper coverage of a case is a manifestation of latent political salience. Using a dataset that contains all articles about High Court decisions published in The Australian newspaper between 1996 and 2016, this paper operationalizes salience by accounting for the number of articles published about a case at each stage of the High Court's decision-making process and by accounting for each article's location in the newspaper. Following Clark, et al. (2015), the paper develops a statistical model to evaluate the efficacy of this measure of case salience in the Australian context. Tom S. Clark, Jeffrey R. Lax, and Douglas Rice, “Measuring the Political Salience of Supreme Court Cases, 3(1) Journal of Law and Courts (Spring 2015), pp. 37-65.

Justin B. Phillips, Victoria Woodman and Edward Elder
Dirty, Nasty, and Effective: Negative Campaigning on Facebook during the 2016 Primaries.
Two decades ago, Ansolabehere and Iyengar's seminal work on negative campaigning introduced significant new evidence into a deeply sceptical field. Their work showed how televised candidate endorsed attack ads could be used strategically to win elections by depressing voter turnout and by reinforcing pre-existing views in the most partisan voters among us. In the time since Going Negative, research continues to express doubt on the persuasiveness of candidate negativity, but the mediums for disseminating these attacks continue to evolve. Social media is one of these new battlefields. This paper investigates whether attacking was an effective means of boosting support on Facebook for candidates in the 2016 U.S. presidential primaries. We find that negative campaigning on Facebook coincided with greater levels of support on the platform for almost all the candidates, indicating it was strategically effective by means of boosting support instead of depressing it. Beyond overall effectiveness, however, the evidence also shows a significant asymmetrical response between men and women to attacks, suggesting that gender and negative campaigning on social media may need deeper investigation going forward.

Mark Boyd
Five Live: TV news coverage of the five most recent national election campaigns in modern English-speaking democracies
Data from national election surveys show that television news continues to be the leading source of political information for voters during election campaigns in most modern democracies. This is despite predictions over the past two decades of the much-heralded, but yet to transpire, 'internet election'. This paper compares primetime television news coverage of the most recent election campaigns in five democracies with 'liberal' media environments according to the typology of Hallin and Mancini: New Zealand (2017), the United Kingdom (2017), the United States (2016), Australia (2016), and Ireland (2016). Comparisons are made between the leading public service, or state-owned, broadcaster, and the leading commercial broadcaster, in each country, using several variables over the month prior to election day: total campaign coverage; prominence of election stories (whether they led the bulletin, or if not, where they were placed); and what other types of news the broadcasters chose to highlight. More detailed analysis is made of a seven-day sample over the same period for the following variables: sound bite length; coverage of party leaders (or presidential candidates in the United States); coverage of major parties compared to minor parties; 'game' and issue coverage; and tone of the coverage.
Panel 7A:
Insecurity, Incomes and Inequality
Chair and Discussant: Simon Jackman

Timothy Hellwig, Yesola Kweon, and Jack Vowles
Political Parties and Mass Perceptions of Insecurity

Insecurity has emerged as a central theme in elections across the developed democracies. But what affects feelings of insecurity? Drawing on research in political economy and political psychology, we argue that individuals’ sense of economic precarity is shaped in large part by governing elites. Governing parties can increase or, alternatively, weaken the relationship between objective and subjective insecurity through use of social policy and elite cues. First, more spending on welfare mitigates the impact of objective insecurity on perceived insecurity. In particular, active labor market programs which equip individuals with upgraded skills that can be utilized in the market have a greater effect. In addition to concrete policy efforts, governing parties can signal cues to help calm insecure voters. By emphasizing concerns for social protection relative to other matters, parties can, through their campaign discourse, quell fears of future economic loss and thus weaken the impact of objective insecurity on perceived insecurity. In order to test these hypotheses, we analyze post-election survey data of 25 OECD countries from 2011 to 2016. The electoral implications of elite-driven insecurity are discussed.

Jack Vowles
Different Slopes and their Estimation: Household Income and Voter Turnout in ‘Big’ and ‘Small’ Data

What if there is bias in sample survey estimates of the key factors that shape voter turnout in comparative research? While strong correlations are found in survey data between low incomes and low voter turnout in the United States, international evidence for the relationship is often wanting, even when data is validated from official records, thus correcting for over-reporting of vote. A significant part of the reason may be non-response bias in the subsamples of those who do not vote, given the invariable correlation between survey non-response and non-voting coupled with widespread decline in survey response rates. We test this conjecture in New Zealand at the 2014 general election. Using a ‘big’ sample of 30,000 from official voting records in conjunction with the validated ‘small’ New Zealand Election Study (response rate 33 per cent), we compare the survey and observational data on turnout as apparently affected by age, gender and income. Because our income data is household median income from census meshblocks, we face two possible contaminants in the ‘big’ data: contextual or neighbourhood effects; and measurement error due to variation in household incomes between the median and that of the individual households sampled. We conclude, subject to some qualifications, that at least for household income, the differences between findings in these two data sources are surprisingly small. However, there are some other reasons to be cautious about comparative research findings on turnout.

1.45-3
Panel 7B
Trade and Its Consequences 2
Chair and Discussant: Jana Von Stein

Dongwook Kim
The Democratic Peace Redux: Statistical Critiques

Over the past three decades the so-called democratic peace thesis that democracies rarely fight a war with each other has become one of the most progressive and robust research programmes in International Relations (IR). Over time the thesis has expanded its theoretical insights and argued that states with high trade dependence and joint international organization membership also rarely fight each other. Thus far the literature has produced a
great number of robust empirical findings, largely based on quantitative methodology. This paper seeks to challenge the democratic peace thesis by revisiting the literature’s empirical findings through novel statistical methods and data. Specifically, this paper argues that the existing statistical evidence of the democratic peace thesis has been confounded by the existing quantitative IR scholars’ failure to address three methodological issues: namely, event dependence, unobserved heterogeneity, and measurement of regime type. This paper explicitly addresses these issues by utilizing repeated events survival analysis and a series of new data on regime type. This paper’s new findings challenge the existing democratic peace literature that has largely ignored these issues.

Timothy Gravelle
Trumping Foreign Policy: Public Diplomacy, Framing, and Public Opinion Abroad
Even as the world’s sole superpower, the United States requires the cooperation of other countries to achieve many of its foreign policy objectives. At the same time, foreign leaders must be responsive to public opinion in their respective countries. The President of the United States thus often serves as “Diplomat in Chief” in public diplomacy efforts to appeal directly to publics abroad. Given Donald Trump’s antagonistic approach to foreign relations and widespread lack of popularity, what are the implications for support for US policy among publics abroad? While previous research on foreign public opinion relying on observational data has found that confidence in the US President is linked to support for American foreign policy goals, the mechanism at work remains unclear. Using original data from survey experiments conducted in Canada and Australia, this paper seeks to clarify the effect of “presidential framing” (presenting a policy goal as endorsed or not endorsed by Trump) on attitudes toward key policy issues in the Canada–US and Australia–US relationships. It focuses on Canadian attitudes toward a renegotiated North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the construction of the cross-border Keystone XL pipeline, and Australian attitudes toward the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) and the Australia–United States refugee swap.

3.30-5.00
Panel 8A
Gender and Sexual Expression
Chair and Discussant: Amy Catalinac

Katrine Beauregard
Women, national identity, and feminism: The case of Quebec
Independence movements exist in many sub-national territories in democracies such as Belgium, Canada, Spain and the United Kingdom. A common finding has been a gender gap where women are less likely than men to support independence. In some cases, the independence movement has tried to rectify this situation by adopting a strong commitment toward gender equality policies and by aligning themselves with the women’s movement to attract women's vote. Little is known, however, about whether this strategy is successful. In this paper, we seek to provide an answer to this question by investigating the case of the province of Quebec in Canada. We posit that older generations of women may conceive of feminism in terms of strict equality between women and men, which can easily align with a national identity based on the French language. On the other hand, younger feminists may have a more intersectional view of gender equality and put greater emphasis on equality across races, ethnicities and sexual orientations, which may clash with a more traditional definition of the francophone Quebec identity. Consequently, we expect that the independence movement’s strategy of appealing to gender equality to attract women's support is not successful for all types of feminists.

Hatsuru Morita
Does Restricting Youth Exposure to Sexual Expression Deter Sexual Offenses?: Evidence
of a Long-term Effect

Whether exposure to sexual expression stimulates or deters sexual offenses is a long-disputed issue. While some psychological studies argue that exposure to sexual expression exacerbates sexually aggressive tendencies and thus increases sexual offenses in the long term, recent empirical work suggests that such exposure deters sexual offenses, at least in the short term. However, the latter mainly focuses on the substitution effect among potential criminals and does not consider the longer-term effects. In response, we provide novel evidence concerning the long-term effect of exposure to sexual expression. In Japan, most prefectures have introduced sexual expression regulations during the last five decades to promote the healthy development of juveniles. The content of these regulations is nearly identical, but the timings of their introduction vary. We employ this exogenous variation to identify the causal effect of sexual expression on various sexual offenses. We find that regulations increased the number of forcible indecencies (moderate sexual offenses) by 16%, but had no effect on rape or other sexual offenses. These findings imply that the substitution effect of sexual expression on sexual offenses outweighs its complementary effect and cast doubt on the effectiveness of regulations in deterring sexual offenses in the long term.

Inaki Sagarzazu and Annika Werner

God, bullies, or born this way? A comparative analysis of legislative speeches around LGBTQIA* issues

Since the adoption of the first law that recognized Same-Sex couples in Denmark in 1990, the debate over Same-Sex Unions (SSUs) and Same-Sex Marriage (SSM) has been taken to many parliaments in the developed and developing world. These discussions, however, have evolved at different paces in different countries and these laws have been both promoted and opposed from both the left and the right of the political spectrum. In this paper we analyze the discussions in three countries of Western Europe (Germany, Spain, and the UK) where SSM was enacted at different points in time and with different bases of support. Through quantitative text analysis we code and classify more than 2000 legislative speeches from 1990 to 2016 pertaining to LGBTQIA* politics broadly. We identify the evolutionary patterns of the frames surrounding these issues, paying particular attention to the discussion around SSUs and SSM. Through our analysis we are able to identify both universal and country-specific frames as well as the temporal sequences of framing and positional changes.

3.30-5.00
Panel 8B
Constructions of Ideology
Chair and Discussant: Tim Gravelle

Luke Mansillo
Xenophobic vote seeking logic: a geography of Coalition swing voting at Australian federal elections

When an electoral system employs multiple single member constituencies parties attempt to maximise seats rather than votes. These two features of Australian electoral law create a logic for the Liberal-National Coalition to seek the most persuadable votes in the most marginal constituencies. Affective political issues organised by a latent dimension of xenophobia within Australian political ideology are consequential for the Coalition’s vote share. Vote transfers to the Coalition in the 2013 federal election and from the Coalition in the 2016 federal election are estimated by electoral geography using Vote Compass data with multi-level modelling and post-stratification. Attitudes towards asylum seeker boat turn backs and deficit reduction are used to predict Coalition transfer votes by geography.

Lara Greaves, Nikhil K. Sengupta, Carly S. Townrow, Danny Osborne, Carla A. Houkamau,
and Chris G. Sibley
Māori, a Politicized Identity: Indigenous Identity, Voter Turnout, Protest, and Political Party Support in Aotearoa New Zealand

Political struggles are important to the identities of many indigenous peoples. This paper examines identity as a predictor of crucial political outcomes on voter turnout, support for protest, and political party support for Māori, the indigenous peoples of Aotearoa (New Zealand). We analyzed data from a national probability sample of Māori (N=663) which included all of the standard demographics, plus a scale of subjective identification with various aspects of Māori identity: the Multidimensional Model of Māori Identity and Cultural Engagement. Use of the scale allowed us to examine the specific facets of ethnic identity that predict political mobilization for indigenous peoples. As expected, the identity domain relating to political struggle, Socio-Political Consciousness, was positively associated with support for left-wing parties and Māori rights protest, but negatively associated with support for the right-wing party. However, Socio-Political Consciousness did not relate to voter turnout. These results demonstrate the importance of ethnic identity as a key predictor of political behaviours and attitudes for indigenous peoples.

Shawn Treier
Characterising the Structure of Ideology Among the New Zealand Public

Political ideology is simultaneously one of the most natural of concepts and one of the most perplexing. The idea of 'liberal', 'moderate', and 'conservative' viewpoints on any particular issue is completely understandable and identifiable, yet characterising the complete belief structures of most respondents is a bewildering task. Whether one expects respondents to be consistently liberal or conservative (or moderate), or allows for a variety of beliefs over different types of issues, any standard measure of ideology requires a decision on the dimensionality over this structure of beliefs. For survey respondents, we often characterise respondents in categories (liberal, moderate, conservative, libertarian and populist) related to perceived underlying positions on economic and social issues. In this paper, using the 2014 New Zealand Election Study, I estimate a typology of ideology based on the responses to issue questions. The model deployed is a Bayesian latent class analysis that estimates the number of distinct ideological groups while simultaneously recovering an easy to interpret ideological structure of each group.